Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/23: CIA-RDP98S00099R000400800005-3 Date 1 8 JUL 1985 ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL JP 10: (frame, office symbol, room number, Initials Date **STAT** Editor, Studies Rm. 1036, Cofc Bldg Action File Note and Return Approval For Clearance Per Conversation As Requested For Correction Prepare Reply Circulate For Your Information See Me Comment investigate Signature Coordination Justify REMARKS **STAT** Dear In case you prefer a conventional book review, I attach one written by STAT **STAT** DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals, clearances, and similar a STAT Room No.-Bldg. 7B42. **STAT** Senior Review Pane 1 **STAT**

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/23 : CIA-RDP98S00099R000400800005-3

OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)

DRAFT/18 July 1985	STAT
SECRECY AND DEMOCRACY By Stansfield Turner	
Reviewed by	STAT

The initial tone of high expectation when Admiral Turner is unexpectedly summoned to Washington by his Annapolis classmate, President Carter, leads to heady speculation of an important posting as Chief of Naval Operations or even possibly Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. This euphoria is quickly deflated by President Carter's announcement of his intention to name Turner DCI, a position which Turner himself describes as being consigned to "the bush leagues." The remaining 300-odd pages of this memoir spare no effort to demonstrate the aptness of his terminology. It is a pity, too, for the historical record would have been far better served by a dispassionate description of the Agency during the Carter administration, and that this book most assuredly is not.

At the outset, and also setting the querulous tone which persists throughout, Admiral Turner takes great exception to the "censorship" to which his manuscript was submitted. Accusing the CIA of "arbitrariness" and "irresponsibility," Admiral Turner asserts that the entire process was further, "terribly costly" to him. Lacking insights into the excisions which the Agency sought, it is simply impossible for the layman to reach any

independent judgment on the validity of his claim, yet it is unfortunate that this squabble colors the text which follows.

Given the title, the reader might reasonably expect to encounter a detailed discussion of the problems of running an intelligence community in a democratic society, and a penetrating analysis of the often conflicting demands of secrecy and the need for public support of our intelligence agencies. Unfortunately, this is not the case, and the body of the book is more an egocentric perception (largely negative) of the intelligence agencies, and a ringing defense of Turner's stewardship as DCI. The titles of selected portions of his work are more revealing of his bias than he may realize: "Espionage: The Dark Science;" "Covert Action: The Dirty Tricks Department;" "Managing the Colossus: " and "Managing the Octopus." He is particularly harsh in his comments on the DDO, which he described as "elitist" and more prestigious than other elements of the Agency, and he broadens his opprobrium by comparing running the Agency from the DCI's office to "operating a power plant from a control room with a wall containing many impressive levers that, on the other side of the wall, has been disconnected." Warming to his theme, he charges that the DDO (euphemistically called the "espionage branch") would not abide by overall CIA regulations, and that he could not even be sure that his directions were being faithfully transmitted to the DDO. He attributes this state of affairs to

his perception that the Agency had grown haphazardly, and that his predecessors had failed to exercise "strong direction" warning that unless this situation is rectified, the Agency will become "unmanageable." If the reader puzzles over the serious charges laid at the door of the DDO, and seeks an explanation for the particular venom reserved for this group, he will not find the true reasons until reaching the chapter devoted to the "Halloween Massacre," his term for the reduction of 820 positions in the DDO by the stroke of a pen. Blaming insensitive subordinates for the unfeeling way in which the terminations were effected, Turner says that only 17 people were actually fired. and 147 were forced to retire early. Warming to his own defense, he asserts that all reductions were made at Headquarters, a statement which is patently untrue, and he bristles that the resentment aroused by these reductions stemmed from the concern in the DDO that if he could summarily reduce the size of the DDO, he might next begin to supervise what it did!

Lest the impression be created that Turner limited his disdain to the DDO of CIA, he was equally generous in administering harsh criticism to both NSA and DIA--the former for its alleged failure to be a team player, and the latter for the lack of qualified personnel.

Unfortunately, this lengthy litary of lamentations largely obscures the series of recommendations formulated by Admiral Turner; also, they do not begin until Chapter 23 on page 268, by which time all but the faithful students of the intelligence world will long since have nodded off. His eleven "Agenda Action" proposals at least merit discussion, whatever one may think of some of them. His proposals to strengthen the DCI's authority and to take effective action against further leakage deserve more than the passing mention they receive in this final chapter of his book. In fact, if Admiral Turner had tossed out the far too basic primer of the intelligence world (far better presented in the works of Ray Cline and Harry Howe Ransom), and devoted his efforts to the very real problems he perceived in his period as DCI, with more analysis of the reasons for them, ending up with his recommendations for ameliorating these deficiencies, as he perceived them, the book could have been both informative and useful. As it is, his petulance gets the better of him, and he also fails to consider that the unresponsiveness of the Agency might just also have been attributable in part to his own arbitrary managerial style.

STAT
0 17 11



SUBJECT: SECRECY AND DEMOCRACY by Stansfield Turner

ODCI/SRP/HM:jsb
Distribution:
Orig. - Editor,
Studies in Intelligence
1 - SRP File
1 - SRP Chrono
1 - Studies in Intelligence

STAT